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   In the fall of 1998, two important financial regulatory reform acts were passed in Japan. The first 
of these acts, the Financial Recovery Act, created a bridge bank scheme and provided funds for the 
resolution of failed banks. The second act, the Rapid Revitalization Act, provided funds for the assistance 
of troubled banks. While both of these acts provided some government assistance to the banking sector, 
they also called for reforms aimed at strengthening the regulatory environment.  
Using an event study framework, this paper examines the evidence in equity markets concerning the 
anticipated impact of the regulatory reforms. Our evidence suggests that the anticipated regulatory impact 
of the Financial Recovery Act was mixed, while the Rapid Revitalization Act was expected to 
disproportionately favor weaker Japanese banks. As such, it appears that the market was skeptical about 
the degree to which the new acts would lead to true banking reform. 
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1 This paper was partially written while Spiegel was visiting the Bank of Japan. Yoshihiro Asai and Hiroshi Kokame 
provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  1 
1.   Introduction 
In the fall of 1998, the Japanese government enacted a number of laws aimed at addressing the difficulties 
facing their troubled financial sector. The two main laws associated with this legislation were the Financial 
Reconstruction Act (FRA) and the Rapid Revitalization Act (RRA). The FRA established the framework for 
dealing with failed Japanese banks, resulting in the voluntary nationalization of the Long Term Credit Bank, 
the involuntary nationalization of the Nippon Credit Bank, and the closure of five Second Regional banks in 
1999. The RRA allowed for the injection of public funds for solvent Japanese banks needing assistance.  
This paper examines the anticipated impact of these laws on Japan’s financial system through an event 
study of the impact of news concerning passage of the laws on the equity values of Japanese banks. In 
particular, our study examines heterogeneity in the sensitivity of bank equity values to news concerning the 
likelihood of the laws’ passage and the expected composition of the laws. We identify disparities in the 
pricing of this news by both bank regulatory status and financial strength. In particular, if news indicating the 
laws passage is priced more positively by banks with greater financial strength or poorer regulatory protection, 
we conclude that the laws were “pro-reform,” in the sense of mitigating the expected assistance to weak banks. 
There have been a large number of studies in the literature examining the impact of changes in United 
States’ bank regulation on bank equity values: Cornett and Tehranian (1989) examine the impact of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. They find significant heterogeneity 
in the pricing of this act between large commercial banks and small commercial banks and savings and loans. 
Cornett and Tehranian (1990) find similar heterogeneity between large commercial banks and small 
commercial banks and savings and loans for the passage of the 1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act. Ohara and Shaw (1990) find that the government’s 1984 announcement that a group of large 
banks were “too-big-to-fail” was priced positively by banks included in the group. Sundaram et al (1992) find 
that the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act had a positive impact 
on both large and small banks and savings and loans. Alexander and Spivey (1994) find heterogeneity in the 
impact of the passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act between financially strong and weak savings 
and loans. Madura and Bartunek (1995) find heterogeneity by bank size and leverage in equity values 
responses to the passage of the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). 
Liang et al (1996) also find heterogeneity in the impact of the passage of FDICIA by bank leverage, but fail to 
find significant differences by bank size. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) confirm the positive impact of FDICIA 
passage on equity values. 
Event studies concerning Japanese regulatory developments include Brewer et al (1999) and Spiegel and 
Yamori (2001), who investigate the impact of bank failure announcements on the equity values of surviving 
banks. Peek and Rosengren (2001) investigated the effect of bank failure announcements on the “Japan 
premium,” the premium that Japanese banks paid relative to their U.S. and European competitors on 2 
Eurodollar loans. They find that sensitivity to adverse news concerning the Japanese financial system was 
systematically related to bank financial health. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of these laws in a number of different manners: First, we examine 
the market’s pricing of portfolios of bank stocks of common regulatory class on dates of significant events 
concerning the passage of the Stabilization Laws. Second, we examine the pricing of portfolios of financially 
weak and strong banks of a certain regulatory class to identify disparities by financial strength. Third, we turn 
to cross-sectional studies of individual bank equities, again searching for differences by bank regulatory status 
or financial strength in sensitivity to dates significant to the passage of the laws.  
Our results suggest that the impact of the regulatory reforms on banks by size was mixed. The FRA was 
seen as disproportionately beneficial to the First and Second Regional Banks relative to the Large and Trust 
banks. However, financially strong First and Second Regional Banks fared better subsequent to news 
concerning the passage of the FRA than weak Regional Banks, while just the opposite was true for the Large 
and Trust Banks. These results suggest that actual closures resulting from the Act - with the exception of the 
imminent closures of Long Term Credit and Nippon Credit Banks – were expected to be largely be limited to 
Regional banks. 
In contrast to the FRA, we find that news conducive to the passage of the RRA was seen as 
disproportionately beneficial to the Large and Trust banks, suggesting that these banks would be the primary 
recipients of the government funds earmarked for the assistance of problem banks. Moreover, the RRA was 
seen as “anti-reform,” in the sense that news concerning the RRA was disproportionately beneficial to 
financially weak banks within all of the banking groups studied. 
The reminder of this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 discusses the events surrounding the 
passage of the FRA and the RRA and introduces the event dates in the study. Section 3 discusses our 
empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses our results for portfolios of banks of a certain regulatory class. 
Section 5 discusses results for portfolios of sub-sample of banks of a certain regulatory class separated by 
financial strength. Section 6 contains the results of cross-sectional studies of the determinants of excess 
returns on event dates by bank characteristics. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.   Passage of the Financial Reconstruction Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act 
2.1 Details of the Acts 
The Financial Reconstruction Act (FRA) was passed as a compromise mechanism for dealing with failed 
Japanese banks. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had favored a “bridge bank” system of failed 
bank resolution. Under a bridge bank system, regulators could close a failed bank prior to locating a suitable 
acquiring bank, without interrupting credit lines for healthy borrowers. The opposition party favored a 3 
“nationalization” plan, under which failed banks would be immediately nationalized and reorganized for 
privatization. The FRA allowed a new institution, the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC) to 
determine whether a failed bank should be nationalized or reorganized under a bridge bank program. It also 
allowed banks to file for nationalization early, as the Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB) did immediately after 
the law’s passage [Hoshi and Patrick (2000)]. 
The Rapid Revitalization Act (RRA) provided for the extension of government funds to troubled, but not 
insolvent banks. In the final version of the RRA, the LDP accepted the opposition’s demands to require all 
financial institutions to properly assess asset values and mark assets to market values more promptly. The 
RRA also established legal penalties for managers who reported false data. 
At the same time that the passage of the RRA was announced, the government announced an agreement 
to expand the public funds designated for financial stabilization from 10 trillion yen to 43 trillion yen. 18 
trillion yen was allocated to the FRA to finance the resolution of failed banks, while 25 trillion yen was 
allocated to the RRA to assist solvent banks. 
 
2.2 Events leading up to passage of the Acts 
The events leading up to the passage of the FRA and the RRA are listed in Table 1. The first event took 
place on July 2, 1998 when the LDP government announced its plan to deal with the huge amount of problem 
loans at Japanese banks. The plan included a number of provisions that appeared to hasten regulatory reform. 
These included provisions to encourage banks to deal with their bad loans, improve their asset transparency 
through the introduction of new accounting standards, and to strengthen bank supervision and regulation.  
However, the primary component of the plan was a scheme to stabilize the financial system through the 
use of a bridge-bank regulatory system. Under this system, authorities could order a failed bank to stop its 
operation without finding an acquiring bank in advance. Instead, a public bridge bank would be established to 
continue operations. The 13 trillion yen in public funds earmarked for the Financial Crisis Management 
Accounts of the Deposit Insurance Cooperation were to be made available to the bridge bank.  
The Nihon Keizai Shinbun (July 3, 1998) predicted that this plan would accelerate the reorganization of 
problem Japanese banks by expediting merger activity. The newspaper also predicted that the law would lead 
to stricter bank regulation, particularly in assuring that banks make greater loan-loss provisions. However, the 
opposition parties criticized the plan, claiming that the bridge bank framework would allow bank managers to 
retain their jobs after a failure.  
The second event in our study is the upper house election on Sunday, July 12, which is treated as event 
date July 13 in our study. The LDP suffered huge losses during the event, which was partly seen as a 
referendum of the LDP’s management of Japan’s financial crisis. The poor results for the LDP implied that 4 
the opposition would have a voice in the shape of the financial reform legislation. After the election, the LDP 
only held 105 of the 252 upper house seats.  
The next event date in the study is the agreement of the opposition parties on counter-legislation to the 
LDP’s bill in the evening on August 25. The opposition parties’ plan called for the creation of the FRC to deal 
with failed banks. However, the plan also called for changes that were expected to toughen Japanese 
regulatory policy: The FRC was to be independent of the Ministry of Finance. The opposition plan also called 
for liquidation -- as opposed to nationalization -- of failed banks, except in cases where closure would lead to 
extreme systemic risk for the financial system. Finally, the use of public funds to support weak functioning 
banks was to be prohibited. 
During September, negotiations took place, culminating in a compromise agreement on the evening of 
Friday, September 25. Earlier tentative agreements had been reached, but had fallen apart. The final 
composition of the FRA was seen as a major concession to the opposition. As the government preferred, the 
FRA codified the establishment of the FRC, reducing the regulatory influence of the Ministry of Finance, and 
introduced the bridge bank system for dealing with failed banks. In addition, the Act allocated public funds 
for the financing of bridge banks to take over nationalized banks. However, as the opposition had demanded, 
the Long-Term-Credit-Bank was to be nationalized and banks were required to report bad loans twice a year. 
The compromise agreement is the fourth event in our study, timed as the first trading day subsequent to the 
news concerning the agreement, Monday, September 28. 
Two relevant events took place on October 2. First, the FRA passed the lower-house. As a compromise 
agreement had already been reached, the lower-house passage did not constitute very significant “news” in 
the sense of new information to the market. However, on the same day, the LDP revealed its proposal for the 
RRA. The LDP’s proposal called for the government to acquire over 50 percent of common stocks of 
international banks with capital ratios less than 4 percent and domestic banks with capital ratios below 2 
percent. The plan also called for the injection of public funds into troubled banks through the purchase of 
preferred stocks. While both of these events occurred on the same day, the compromise agreement implied 
that passage of the FRA was already all but certain. Consequently, we interpret market changes on that date as 
primarily reflecting the revelation of the RRA proposal. 
On October 12, the FRA passed the upper house and became law. Again, as in the case of the lower-house 
passage, this did not constitute particularly significant news to the market. However, for the sake of 
completeness, we include it as the sixth event in our time series. 
On the evening of October 12, agreement was reached between the LDP and the opposition Heiwa-
Kaikaku Party concerning the RRA. The agreement implied that while the Democratic Party, the largest 
opposition party, still opposed the plan, the LDP now had sufficient votes to get the law passed. Under the 
compromise agreement, the LDP’s plans to use public funds were retained in return for several concessions, 5 
including stricter standards concerning the reporting of banks’ asset positions and their setting of loan loss 
reserves, and legal penalties for bank managers who falsify data. In addition, the funds set aside for public 
assistance of problem banks were increased from the 10 trillion yen initially sought by the LDP to 43 trillion 
yen, which consisted of an 18-trillion-yen Financial Reconstruction Account for failed banks and a 25-trillion-
yen Rapid Restoration Account for problem banks.  
This is the seventh event in our time series. Since this event took place after the market close, it is timed 
as occurring on October 13. In addition, on the morning of October 13, the RRA was passed by the lower-
house. The seventh event date therefore constitutes both of these events. However, as the compromise 
agreement implied that passage was all but certain, we interpret market changes on that date as primarily 
reflecting the terms of the compromise. 
Finally, on Friday, October 16, the RRA was passed by the upper house and became law. Again, this event 
is unlikely to be extremely important on its own as a compromise agreement had already been reached, but 
we include it for completeness. 
 
3.   Methodology and Data 
3.1 Event study methodology 
We examine the impact of news concerning the events listed above on portfolios of banks of common 
regulatory class and on subsets of these groups that exhibit similar financial strength. We follow the event 








             (1)  
where  pt R  represents the return on the bank portfolio on day t,  p a  represents the constant term, 
mp b represents the bank portfolio’s market beta,  mt R  represents the market return on day t measured as the 
daily return on the TOPIX index,  ip b represents the portfolio’s sensitivity to changes in the interest rate, 
t i D represents changes in the overnight call rate,  pe g  represents the sensitivity of the bank stock portfolio to 
event e, De is a dummy variable for event e, equal to one when t=e and 0 otherwise, and ept  is a random 
disturbance term. Under this methodology,  pe g  represents the abnormal return of the bank portfolio on day t.  
As in Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), we use the unorthogonalized two-index model. While other studies 
have used an orthogonalized framework [e.g. Flannery and James (1984)], these procedures have been shown 
to produce biased standard error estimates [Giliberto (1985), Kane and Unal (1988)]. 6 
Our specification estimates events within a single-day “event window.”  Our estimation methodology is 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Given that our error terms are independent, identically-distributed and normal, 
OLS should give unbiased estimates in event studies  [MacKinlay (1997)]. Without normality, our results 
would not be exact in finite samples, but Brown and Warner (1985) have demonstrated that convergence to 
the asymptotic results is likely to be relatively fast. To ensure that our results are not driven by 
heteroscedasticity, we use White’s general standard error correction for heteroscedasticity. 
Previous studies have also used SUR estimation techniques [e.g. Grammatikos and Saunders (1990) and 
Aharony and Swary (1996)] to gain efficiency by estimating different event study specifications jointly. 
However, as noted by Kane and Gibson (1996), SUR regression is identical to OLS in our specification 
because all the portfolios have the same set of regressors.
2  Kane and Gibson use SUR regression to test the 




Daily closing equity values for 114 Japanese banks were obtained from the Toyo-Keizai Kabuka CD-
ROM for 737 days from January 6, 1997 to December 30, 1999. When a stock was not traded on a single day, 
it was assigned the previous day’s closing price. Many Japanese banks list their stocks on several exchanges, 
such as Tokyo and Osaka. We adopt the convention of using the stock prices on the exchanges where the 
stock was most actively traded. Newly listed or de-listed banks whose equity values were not available were 
dropped from the sample. We also dropped thinly traded banks, defined as those who reported no transactions 
on more than 40 days in our sample period. This left us with 92 banks in our sample. Interest rate data was 
obtained from the Federal Reserve’s FAME database. 
As the bank failure announcements affected all banks in the sample on the failure date, we cannot assume 
that the residual returns are independent across banks. A standard response in the event study literature [e.g., 
O’Hara and Shaw  (1990)] is to use the returns on a portfolio of banks. We therefore first construct several 
portfolios of banks based on their administrative category. The bank portfolios included in the study are All, a 
portfolio of all 92 banks in our sample, Large, a portfolio of the nine city banks and the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, Trust, a portfolio of seven trust banks, First Regional, a portfolio of the 55 First Regional banks; and 
Second Regional, a portfolio of the 20 Second Regional banks. In general, the First Regional banks are larger 
than Second Regional banks and have a higher probability of receiving favorable regulatory treatment.  
                                                 
2 See Kennedy (1998) for more details. 
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4.   Portfolio results 
The results of estimation of equation (1) are shown in Table 2. The full portfolio did not display a 
statistically significant response to the first event, the government’s announcement of its plan for the FRA. 
Looking at the portfolios of the sub-samples, it is clear that this failure is caused by heterogeneity between the 
different classes of banks. The announcement was priced negatively by both the large and trust bank 
portfolios (with –1.40 percent and –2.25 percent returns respectively), but priced positively by both the first 
and second regional bank portfolios (with 0.15 and 0.66 percent returns respectively).  
These results may indicate that plan had more adverse regulatory implications for large banks than had 
been expected. First, the plan called for the Financial Supervisory Agency to conduct extensive on-sight 
examinations of Large and Trust banks. These additional examinations may necessitate less profitable lending 
practices, such as the buildup of loan loss reserves at these banks. 
In addition, the discrepancy between the pricing of the event by Large and Trust banks and that by the 
First and Second Regional banks may indicate that the market perceived that the announced plan for the FRA 
was more comprehensive than had been anticipated. In addition to the largest banks, whose difficulties would 
need to be addressed under any stabilization program, the program appears to have been perceived as 
providing assistance to the regional banks as well. Holding the amount of funds available for assistance 
constant, broadening the coverage of assistance would bad news for the large and trust banks, as the funds 
available for their assistance would be depleted. 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the coefficient estimate on the second regional bank portfolio 
is significantly greater than that on the first regional banks at a 5 percent confidence level. First regional 
banks were also generally privy to greater regulatory protection than their second regional bank counterparts.  
The next event is the LDP’s loss of majority in the Upper House of the Diet on July 13. The pricing of 
this event is also heterogeneous across banking portfolios, but there seems to be little pattern to the 
heterogeneity. The full sample portfolio prices the event positively (with a return of 0.20 percent), as does the 
large bank portfolio and the first regional bank portfolio (with returns of 0.83 and 0.27 percent respectively). 
However the trust bank portfolio and the second regional bank portfolio price the event negatively (with 
returns of -0.31 and –0.06 respectively, although the estimate for the second regional bank portfolio is 
insignificant). 
The lack of a clear pattern in the pricing of the election results probably reflects uncertainty about what 
the results meant for Japanese banks. Some interpreted the election results as indicating that reforms were 
imminent, which could imply an overall recovery that would also benefit Japan’s banks. On the other hand, it 
was also understood that the opposition would now move to block what they viewed as excessive protection 
of Japanese banks, particularly the treatment of large banks as being “too-big-to-fail.”  8 
This change can be clearly seen in the market’s pricing of the next event, the unveiling of the opposition’s 
alternative plan. This event was priced significantly negative by all of the portfolios, with the large bank 
portfolio experiencing the largest decline (a return of –3.16 percent). The announcement cast doubt on the 
degree of assistance banks, particularly large banks, would receive in the financial stabilization packages, as it 
prohibited the protection of large banks through bridge banks.  
The announcement that compromise had been reached on the FRA on September 28 was priced 
significantly positive by the full sample portfolio (with a return of 0.35 percent). Nevertheless, there is 
heterogeneity by bank group similar to that found in the first event. The large and trust bank groups priced the 
event negatively (with returns of –2.55 and –5.72 percent respectively), while the event was priced positively 
by the first and second regional banks (with returns of 1.31 and 1.29 percent respectively). 
The positive pricing of the compromise indicates that the FRA agreement reduced the uncertainty 
regarding Japanese financial system and was in net seen as positive for the banking sector. The exceptional 
behavior of the large and trust banks may be attributable to the details of the agreement regarding closure. The 
FRA allowed for nationalization to be imposed even on banks that were not yet insolvent. This type of 
nationalization actually took place with Nippon Credit Bank. The easing of restrictions concerning 
nationalization affected large and trust banks disproportionately adversely, as only these types of banks were 
considered candidates for nationalization.  
The next event date, October 2, contained news relevant to the passage of both the FRA and the RRA. 
The FRA was passed in the lower house, while the primary news on that date was the announcement of the 
public funds package under the RRA. The news was unambiguously treated as positive for all of the bank 
portfolios. The full sample portfolio had a return of 1.16 percent. The largest single-group return was found 
for the large bank portfolio with an estimated return of 2.61 percent. 
The upper house passage of the FRA on October 12 was also priced positively for all portfolio groups 
except the Second Regional banks. The full sample portfolio had a return of 5.11 percent. The largest single-
group return was again found for the large bank portfolio with a return of 2.58 percent. 
The compromise on the RRA was reached on October 13 and it passed the lower house. As we discussed 
above, the opposition exacted some concessions in the form of stricter bank supervision in return for its 
acceptance of the use of public funds to assist banks. It can be seen from the pricing of this event that these 
concessions appear to have been interpreted as bad news for the regional bank groups. Both the first and 
second regional bank groups priced the news negatively (with returns of –1.86 and –1.16 percent 
respectively). In contrast, the event appears to have represented good news for the large and trust banks, with 
returns of 3.09 and 3.85 percent respectively. It appears that these banks were perceived to disproportionately 
benefit from the provisions for capital injections to solvent banks. 9 
Finally, the RRA passed the upper house on October 16. This event was hardly a surprise given that a 
compromise agreement had already been reached and the law had passed the lower house. However, the event 
was priced negatively by all portfolio groups except the second regional bank group. The full sample portfolio 
had a negative return of –0.69 percent. The steepest price decline was experienced by the large bank portfolio, 
which had a return of –3.23 percent.  
 
5.   Portfolio Return Differences by Financial Strength 
To examine the implications of bank financial strength on the impact of the Stabilization Laws, we also 
constructed portfolios of subsets of the large and regional bank group portfolios examined above. These 
subsets are divided on the basis of financial strength.  
For the Large and Trust banks in the sample, direct credit ratings are available. Using the Moody’s credit 
rating as of October 1998, the weakest Large and Trust banks in our sample are Daiwa Bank, Chuo Trust 
Bank, and Yasuda Trust Bank.
3  These banks all received the lowest rating of Baa3 in our sample. We 
therefore constructed a portfolio of these banks entitled Weak Major.
4  The remaining Large and Trust banks 
were then grouped into a portfolio entitled Strong Major. 
For most of the regional banks, however, credit ratings were not available. Instead, we used information 
from bank dividends from March 1997 to identify bank financial strength. Most Japanese banks traditionally 
set their annual dividends per share at the same level, usually greater than or equal to five yen. Nevertheless, 
banks that experience financial difficulties often halt dividend payments, as Hyogo Bank did in 1992. As a 
result, interruption of dividend payments provides a signal of financial difficulty.  
We therefore specify problem regional banks as those paying dividends of less than five yen. Six of the 
First Regional banks and three of the Second Regional banks in our sample paid less than five yen dividends 
per share.
5  These comprise the portfolio of six First Regional banks entitled Weak First Regional and the 
portfolio of three Second Regional banks entitled Weak Second Regional.
6 The remaining first and Second 
Regional banks are formed into the Strong First Regional and Strong Second Regional portfolios. 
                                                 
3 Recall that due to their failures, the weakest large Japanese banks, Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank, 
are not included in our sample. 
4 The large and trust bank portfolios were pooled because treating them separately would have only Daiwa as the weak 
large bank and only Chuo and Yasuda as the weak trust banks. 
5 Nippon Trust Bank is excluded as it was a subsidiary of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. As above, we also excluded failed 
Regional Banks.  
6 The banks included in the First Regional weak portfolio are Hokkaido Bank, Hokuriku Bank, Ikeda Bank, Kantou 
Bank, Kiyou Bank, and Osaka Bank, while the banks included in the Second Regional weak portfolio include Hanshin 
Bank, Kansai Bank, and Kinki Bank. 10 
The differences in the returns for the portfolio sub-samples separated by financial strength are shown in 
Table 3.
7  Recall from Table 2 that the first event, the announcement of the LDP plan for the FRA was priced 
significantly negative for the Large and Trust bank portfolios and significantly positive for the two regional 
bank portfolios. Table 3 demonstrates that within these portfolios there were also measurable differences. In 
particular, the impact on the weak major banks was measurably less negative than that on the strong major 
banks. As a result, while the LDP plan for the FRA was priced negatively for the large and trust banks as 
groups, the weakest large and trust banks priced the event measurably less negatively than the stronger Major 
banks. The results for the regional banks, in contrast, are insignificant. 
An interesting pattern also emerges for the compromise agreement on the FRA on 9/28 (event D4). Recall 
from Table 2 that this event was priced measurably negatively for the Large and Trust banks, but measurably 
positively for the First and Second Regional banks. The results in Table 3 indicate that the event was 
measurably less negative for the weak Major banks than for the strong Major banks. This indicates that within 
the class of Major banks the compromise was perceived to provide a relatively good outcome for the weaker 
banks. While the increased regulation called for under the FRA would have adverse implications for all major 
banks, equity holders of the weakest banks would stand to benefit most from the capital injections called for 
under the Act. In contrast, the event was priced positively for the First and Second Regional banks, but the 
results in Table 3 indicate that it was priced less positively for the weakest First and Second Regional Banks 
than for the rest of the group. 
This pattern again indicates that some degree of reform was perceived to be included in the FRA, but that 
it was perceived to be limited to the smaller banks in the system. While the market treated the compromise 
agreement as bad news for the Large and Trust banks, the news was treated as better for the weak major banks. 
In contrast, while the market treated the FRA compromise agreement as good news for First and Second 
Regional Banks, the weaker banks within each of these regulatory classes treated the agreement as less 
positive news than their stronger counterparts. This indicates that the concessions granted in the agreement 
towards financial reforms were expected to be applied to the First and Second Regional Banks more diligently 
than to the Large and Trust Banks. 
Finally, the 10/13 event (D5), in which a compromise agreement was reached for the RRA, also has an 
interesting pattern. Recall that the event was priced positively for the Large and Trust Banks, but negatively 
for the First and Second Regional banks. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that the event was priced more 
positively (or less negatively) for the weaker Regional Banks, although not significantly so for the weaker 
Major banks. This result also provides some indication that the RRA was perceived to disproportionately 
benefit the weaker Japanese banks. 
                                                 
7 Full regression results are available upon request from the authors. 
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6.  Cross-sectional evidence 
This section investigates the cross-sectional evidence concerning the impact of the event dates leading to 
the passage of the FRA and RRA on bank equity values. Following Brewer, et al (1999) and Spiegel and 
Yamori (2001), we proceed in two stages: First, we estimate excess returns for each of the 92 banks in our 
sample for each event date. Second, we regress the estimated excess returns on each event date on several 
fundamental variables, including the size of each bank.  
We use the natural log of total assets, ASSETS, as a proxy for bank size. If market participants believed 
that large banks benefit more from the news concerning the Stabilization laws on a given event date, the 
ASSETS variable should carry a positive sign on that date. Since our specification conditions for financial 
position, we would expect the primary impact of the Stabilization laws on the ASSETS variable to reflect 
changes in the relative safety net for larger banks with the passage of those laws. In particular, we would 
expect a negative coefficient on the ASSETS variable on event dates that correspond to news favorable to 
concessions in the FRA to the Opposition demands that too-big-to-fail policy be curtailed. 
We also examine financial strength. If the news on the examined event date was expected to benefit weak 
banks more than strong ones, we would expect negative coefficient estimates on indicators of financial 
strength and positive coefficients on indicators of financial weakness. We introduce three bank risk measures: 
First, we measure leverage with CAPRATIO a measure of the ratio of equity to total assets. We also use the 
ratio of bad loans in the bank’s lending portfolio to total assets, BADLOAN. Our definition of bad loans 
includes loans with delayed or reduced payments, as well as loans to bankrupt firms. Finally, we use the 
returns on equity, ROE, as a proxy for current performance or profitability.  
Because different regulatory classes of banks are treated differently, we introduce dummies for bank 
regulatory classes. TRUST, RB1, and RB2 represent dummies indicating trust banks, first regional banks and 
second regional banks respectively. As such, the coefficient on the constant term can be interpreted as 
reflecting the excess returns experienced by banks in the Large group. 
The results are shown in Table 4. Looking across the event dates, one can see that the event dates with the 
highest Adjusted R-squares are events D4 and D7, the dates of the compromise agreements on the FRA and the 
RRA respectively. In addition, event D2 displayed the lowest adjusted R-squared, supporting the hypothesis 
that this event increased the uncertainty concerning the impact of the legislation.  
We organize our remaining discussion in terms of the explanatory variables. The ASSETS variable enters 
significantly on three event dates. First, the ASSETS variable enters measurably negative on the two event 
dates that would be most closely associated with passage of the FRA. These are the announcement of the LDP 
plan for the FRA on July 2 and the announcement of the compromise agreement on the FRA on September 28. 
These results are consistent with the portfolio results above that suggested that the Large and Trust banks 
would benefit less from the passage of the FRA than the Regional banks. 12 
However, the announcement of the compromise agreement on the RRA has a statistically significant 
positive coefficient on the ASSETS variable. This would indicate that large banks were expected to benefit 
more from the RRA than small banks. This result would be intuitive if large banks were expected to 
disproportionately benefit from the capital injections for solvent banks, or if the small banks were expected to 
face disproportionate increases in the strictness of regulatory policy. 
The BADLOANS variable enters significantly negative on the October 12 date of the passage of the FRA 
in the upper house. This result sheds doubt on the hypothesis that the FRA acted disproportionately in the 
interest of troubled banks. However, the variable enters positively and significantly on October 13, the date of 
the compromise agreement on the RRA and its lower-house passage. This result indicates that the RRA was 
seen to disproportionately benefit weak banks. 
The CAPRATIO variable enters significantly for three of the individual event dates. First it enters 
positively on September 28, the date of the compromise agreement for the FRA. This result suggests that the 
benefits associated with the FRA were expected to be greater for less leveraged firms. This result is probably 
driven by the performance of regional banks in Table 3, which demonstrated that strong regional banks 
performed better on this date than weak regional banks. As 75 of the 92 banks in our sample are regional 
banks, the cross-sectional results would disproportionately reflect regional bank results. 
The CAPRATIO variable also enters significantly negatively on the October 3 and October 12 event dates. 
These dates correspond to the passage of the FRA in the lower house and the announcement of the plan for 
the RRA, and the passage of the FRA in the upper house respectively. If we interpret the October 3 date as 
primarily reflecting the RRA announcement as the FRA compromise has already been struck, the negative 
coefficient on the CAPRATIO variable can be understood as an indicator that the RRA was expected to be 
anti-reform. However, the negative coefficient on the CAPRATIO variable for the October 12 event date is 
surprising in light of the negative coefficient obtained for the same date on the BADLOAN variable.
8 
The ROE variable fails to enter significantly for any of the individual event dates. 
Turning to the group dummies, the TRUST dummy enters significantly negative on the July 2 
announcement date of the LDP plan for the FRA, and on the September 28 announcement of the compromise 
agreement on the FRA. This supports the hypothesis that the trust banks were perceived to benefit less than 
other groups from the financial stabilization package.  
The regional bank dummies enter significantly negative on October 12 event date (D6), the date of the 
upper house passage of the FRA. This supports the evidence above that the regional banks were expected to 
benefit less from the FRA than the large and trust banks. The regional bank dummies also enter significantly 
positive at a ten percent confidence level on August 26
th, the date of the unveiling of the Opposition’s 
                                                 
8 The negative coefficient on CAPRATIO becomes insignificant when the BADLOAN variable is dropped from the 
specification. 13 
alternative plan for the FRA (D3) and on October 16
th, the date of upper house passage of the RRA (D8). The 
August 26
th results probably reflect that the Opposition’s alternative plan would have worse implications for 
the Large and Trust banks than for the regional banks. The October 16
th results probably reflect the 
expectation that the benefits to Large and Trust banks would be less than expected due to the growing demand 
for punishment of management of banks receiving public funds.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
The Japanese financial reforms of 1998 included the Financial Reform Act (FRA), which determined the 
new framework for dealing with failed banks, and the Rapid Revitalization Act (RRA), which provided for 
the injection of government funds to assist weak solvent banks. Because of political constraints faced by the 
ruling LDP Party, these acts represented a compromise in which assistance to the troubled banking sector was 
granted in return for regulatory reforms. As such, it was unclear whether the passage of these acts were 
expected to lead to true reform of the banking system or whether the injection of government funds into the 
system would facilitate prolonged delay in financial reform. 
This paper examines the market’s perception of the impact of these acts through the movement of 
Japanese bank equity values over the period of news concerning the passage of the Acts. We examine 
portfolios of banks by regulatory groups and by subsets separated by bank strength. We also examine cross 
sectional evidence concerning the determinants of excess returns for a bank by regulatory group and bank 
characteristics.  
Our results suggest that the FRA was expected to diminish the regulatory advantages enjoyed by large 
banks. We find the Large and Trust bank group portfolios significantly negatively priced both the July 2 
government announcement of its plans for the FRA and the September 28
th compromise agreement on the 
FRA, while these events were priced significantly positive for the First and Second Regional Bank portfolios. 
In addition, the cross-sectional results suggested that the abnormal returns on these event dates were 
significantly negatively related to bank size, as measured by total assets. 
The evidence concerning the impact of the FRA by financial strength was mixed. On one hand, there was 
some indication that the FRA would disproportionately benefit financially stronger banks, suggesting that the 
Act was “pro-reform” to some extent. Portfolio results for the September 28
th FRA compromise date showed 
strong First and Second Regional Banks performing measurably better than their financially weak 
counterparts. In addition, the cross-sectional evidence shows that the CAPRATIO variable entered 
significantly positive on that date, suggesting that less-leveraged firms were expected to do better under the 
agreed-upon terms of the FRA. The BADLOAN variable is also significantly negative on the October 12 upper 
house passage date. 14 
Nevertheless, portfolio results for the Large and Trust Banks separated by financial strength showed weak 
Large and Trust Banks performing measurably better than their financially strong counterparts on both the 
July 2 announcement date and the September 28th compromise date. In the case of the July 2 date, the 
discrepancy appears to indicate that the LDP’s original plan for the FRA would have benefited weak Large 
and Trust banks because of the maintenance of too-big-to-fail policies through the bridge bank system. In the 
case of the compromise date, the disparity in results by financial strength may have reflected a reduction in 
the share of banks perceived as candidates for closure. In particular, it became clear that that the FRA would 
be invoked primarily to close Regional banks, and would not result in the closure of any Large and Trust 
banks. 
Indeed, that is what appears to have taken place subsequent to the passage of the law, as five regional 
banks were closed over the following year, but no large or trust banks were nationalized following the 
immediate closure of Long Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank. 
In contrast, our results for the RRA suggested that the Large and Trust Banks were expected to 
disproportionately benefit from that Act relative to their First and Second Regional Bank counterparts. The 
October 13
th date of the compromise agreement on the RRA was priced measurably positive for the Large and 
Trust bank portfolios, but measurably negative for the First and Second Regional Bank Portfolios. In addition, 
our cross-sectional results show that abnormal returns on that event date were significantly positively related 
to bank size as measured by total assets. 
There also appears to be relatively robust evidence that news concerning the passage of the RRA was 
treated as “anti-reform,” in the sense that the act was perceived to disproportionately benefit weaker Japanese 
banks. In particular, with portfolio groups separated by financial strength, weaker banks in all groups priced 
the October 13
th RRA compromise more positively than stronger banks. This disparity was significant for the 
First and Second Regional Banks, but insignificant for the Large and Trust banks. In addition, the cross-
sectional results indicate that abnormal returns on the compromise date were significantly positively 
correlated with the BADLOANS variable. 
In summary, our results suggest that while there was some perception that the FRA would lead to adverse 
treatment of weaker regional banks, the market expressed a healthy skepticism that the overall regulatory 
changes of 1998 would lead to serious regulatory reform. News concerning the passage of the laws, 
particularly the RRA, was treated as disproportionately beneficial to the weaker banks in the Japanese 
financial system. Given the performance of Japan’s banking system subsequent to the passage of the FRA and 
the RRA, it appears that the apparent skepticism of the market concerning the pace of reform afforded by 
these regulatory changes was validated. 
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Table 1 
Events surrounding the passage of the Financial Reconstruction Act (FRA)  




Event     Event Date    Description 
 
D1    7/2/98    Government announces plan to deal with problem loans at  
Japanese banks (FRA). 
 
D2     7/13/98   Upper house election takes place. LDP loses its majority. 
 
D3    8/26/98   Opposition unveils alternative reform plan. 
 
D4    9/28/98   Compromise agreement reached on FRA. 
 
D5    10/2/98   FRA passed in lower-house. Government announces plan  
to inject public funds into banking system (RRA). 
 
D6    10/12/98  FRA passes upper house. 
 
D7    10/13/98  Compromise agreement reached on RRA. RRA passes lower-house. 
 




Bank Portfolio Results 
 
Variable or event date  All Banks  Large Banks  Trust Banks  1st Regional  2nd 
Regional 
           
p a   -0.0007**  -0.0010  -0.0013  -0.0006**  -0.0006* 
  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.0008)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
mt R   0.79922**  1.7798**  1.8906**  0.6112**  0.4439** 
  (0.0272)  (0.0649)  (0.0830)  (0.0285)  (0.0246) 
t i D   0.0054  -0.0377  -0.0467  0.0176  0.0115 
  (0.0138)  (0.0247)  (0.0401)  (0.0115)  (0.0150) 
D1 – FRA LDP Plan  -0.0009  -0.0140**  -0.0225**  0.0015**  0.0066** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0013)  (0.0022)  (0.0006)  (0.0008) 
D2 – U. House Election  0.00214**  0.0083**  -0.0031**  0.0027**  -0.0006 
  (0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0014)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
D3 – FRA Opp. Plan  -0.0112**  -0.0316**  -0.0247**  -0.0067**  -0.0088** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
D4 – FRA Compromise  0.0035**  -0.0255**  -0.0572**  0.0131**  0.0129** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0011)  (0.0014)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
D5 – RRA LDP Plan  0.0116**  0.0261**  0.0256**  0.0096**  0.0050** 
  (0.0005)  (0.0009)  (0.0014)  (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
D6 – FRA U. House  0.0051**  0.0258**  0.0178**  0.0029**  -0.0035** 
  (0.0012)  (0.0028)  (0.0036)  (0.0011)  (0.0010) 
D7 – RRA Compromise  -0.0073**  0.0309**  0.0385**  -0.0186**  -0.0116** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0016)  (0.0021)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
D8 – RRA U. House  -0.0069**  -0.0323**  -0.0390**  -0.0017*  0.0025** 
  (0.0009)  (0.0021)  (0.0028)  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
           
R-square  0.6755  0.6452  0.5265  0.5861  0.3531 
Log Likelihood  2568.15  1931.9  1708.22  2611.45  2496.31 
F-Statistic  151.1686  132.03  80.751  102.8231  39.643 
           
                                                 
9  Whites heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  


















       
D1 – FRA LDP Plan  0.006**  0  0 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
       
D2 – U. House Election  0.008**  -0.004**  0.010** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
D3 – FRA Opp. Plan  0.014**  -0.005**  0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
D4 – FRA Compromise  0.065**  -0.033**  -.018** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
D5 – RRA LDP Plan  -0.013**  -0.009**  0.01** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
D6 – FRA U. House  0.014**  -0.01**  -0.01** 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
       
D7 – RRA Compromise  0.001  0.011**  0.031** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
       
D8 – RRA U. House  -0.015**  -0.010**  0 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
 
                                                 
10 Full regression results are available upon request from the authors. Major banks include Large and Trust banks. 
White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  











ROE  TRUST  RB1  RB2  Adj-
R2 
                   
D1 – FRA LDP Plan  0.145  -0.009*  0.137  -0.025  0.007  -0.026**  -0.010  -0.011  0.171 
  (1.614)  (-1.835)  (0.505)  (-0.128)  (0.916)  (-2.418)  (-0.631)  (-0.591)   
                   
D2 – U. House 
Election 
-0.044  0.002  0.170  0.384  -0.014  -0.017  -0.001  -0.004  0.026 
  (-0.626)  (0.520)  (0.685)  (1.611)  (-1.533)  (-1.100)  (-0.117)  (-0.288)   
                   
D3 – FRA Opp. Plan  -0.046  0.000  0.031  0.287  0.002  0.004  0.022*  0.022*  0.127 
  (-0.712)  (0.113)  (0.155)  (1.402)  (0.218)  (0.285)  (1.918)  (1.790)   
                   
D4 – FRA 
Compromise 
0.176  -0.010**  0.750  1.486**  -0.011  -0.091**  -0.016  -0.020  0.405 
  (1.314)  (-1.995)  (1.633)  (3.101)  (-0.780)  (-3.106)  (-0.790)  (-0.899)   
                   
D5 – RRA LDP Plan  0.064  -0.001  -0.424  -0.590**  -0.007  0.013  -0.010  -0.018  0.065 
  (0.768)  (-0.221)  (-1.486)  (-2.401)  (-0.832)  (0.877)  (-0.725)  (-1.110)   
                   
D6 – FRA U. House  0.178*  -0.006  -1.286**  -0.594**  0.009  0.015  -0.040**  -0.040**  0.174 
  (1.668)  (-1.100)  (-4.086)  (-2.224)  (0.893)  (0.716)  (-2.051)  (-2.070)   
                   
D7 – RRA 
Compromise 
-0.260**  0.015**  1.247**  0.301  0.007  0.007  -0.011  0.002  0.371 
  (-2.614)  (2.843)  (3.581)  (1.025)  (0.890)  (0.305)  (-0.632)  (0.075)   
                   
D8 – RRA U. House  -0.079  0.002  -0.254  0.648  -0.012  -0.008  0.0280*  0.037*  0.221 
  (-0.621)  (0.267)  (-0.692)  (1.643)  (-1.134)  (-0.586)  (1.7567)  (1.714)   
                   
 
                                                 
11 Whites heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% confidence level, 
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